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FEATURE

ARTICLE

Does The Consumer Fraud Act
Require Proof of Reliance?
by EdwardX. Clinton, Jr.

The Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business PracticesAct ("theAct") prohibits misleading and deceptive business practices in connection with any trade or business.' The
legislature's purpose was to help consumers obtain remedies against businesses for deceptive
sales practices.' The legislature accomplishes its
purpose through the Act by eliminating the requirement that the plaintiff must prove a defendant intended to defraud. Additionally, prevailing plaintiffs are allowed to recover attorney's

deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation or the concealment,
suppression or omission of any material
fact, with intent that others rely upon the
concealment, suppression or omission of
such material fact, or the use or employment of any practice described in Section 2
of the 'Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
Act,' approved August 5, 1965, in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby
declared unlawful whether any person has
in fact been misled, deceived or damaged
fees. 3 Some courts hold that consumers need not
5
show reliance to prevail under the Act; however,
thereby.
This section requires proof of reliance
other courts disagree. This article explores the
split in the courts and explains how the Illinois where a plaintiff relies on an omission or conSupreme Court's decision in Martin v. Heinold cealment of a material fact. 6 However, the secCommodities4 has implied a tentative resolution tion contains no such requirement for misrepreto the debate.
sentation cases.
Several courts listed the elements of a
misrepresentation claim as follows:
I.
The Reliance Debate
To recover under the Act, a plaintiff must
Illinois courts are sharply divided over
prove that: (1) a statement by the seller;
whether proof of reliance is necessary to state a
(2) of an existing or future material fact;
claim under the Act. Two types of claims exist
(3) that was untrue, without regard to
under the Act: a claim based upon a misrepredefendant's knowledge or lack thereof of
sentation and a claim based upon an omission of
a material fact. The Act treats each type of claim
differently:
Edward X. Clinton, Jr.is an associUnfair methods of competition and unfair
ate with Katten, Muchin & Zavis in
or deceptive acts or practices, including but
Chicago,Illinois.
not limited to the use or employment of any
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such untruth; (4) made for the purpose of
inducing reliance; (5) on which the victim
relies; and (6) which resulted in damages
to the victim.7
To the contrary, the First District Appellate Court of Illinois eliminated the reliance requirement and held that a plaintiff "need not show
actual reliance nor diligence in ascertaining the
accuracy of the misstatements." 8
II.
The Illinois Supreme Court's
Decision in Siegel v. Levy
In Siegel v. Levy Org. Dev. Co., the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "significantly, the
Act does not require actual reliance."9 This statement appears to resolve the reliance debate. However, the Supreme Court's statement in Siegel
may have been dicta. In Siegel, the plaintiff
brought actions for common law and consumer
fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant on both counts. The appellate
court reversed on the fraud count, finding disputed issues of fact, but affirmed the dismissal
of the consumer fraud count. The Illinois Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the appellate court
and reinstated the consumer fraud count. The
court held that "facts satisfying a claim for common law fraud will necessarily satisfy a claim
under the Act."'"
The pronouncement in Siegel concerning
reliance may be dicta because the parties did not
argue whether a plaintiff must allege reasonable
reliance under the Act. The Siegel court determined that the elements for proof of a consumer
fraud count are subsumed in the elements of common law fraud. If a plaintiff can prove fraud, the
plaintiff must satisfy all elements of a consumer
fraud action as well. Thus, even if the Act re-
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quired proof of reliance, the Siegel court would
have reached an identical result. Therefore, the
Illinois Supreme Court has not heard argument
on whether the Act requires proof of reliance.
However, in Martinv. HeinoldCommodities, Inc., a consumer fraud case, the Supreme
Court of Illinois quoted Siegel and stated that
the Act does not require proof of reliance." Thus,
it appears well-settled that a consumer plaintiff
need not prove she relied on a defendant's statements in order to prove consumer fraud under
2
the Act.
III.
Post-Siegel Confusion Among The
Appellate Courts
Even after the Siegel court stated that a
plaintiff need not prove reliance, one appellate
decision held that private plaintiffs must prove
reliance. In Elipas Enters., Inc. v. Silverstein,3
the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for failure to allege reasonable reliance. Elipas distinguished Siegel on the ground that the Act allows
the Attorney General to file enforcement suits
and that the Attorney General should not be required to prove that he relied on a defendant's
statements. 4 According to the First District Appellate Court, a private party must establish reasonable reliance.
In Siegel and Martin, the plaintiffs were
private parties, as was the plaintiff in Elipas.
Therefore, the distinction drawn in Elipas between private parties and the Attorney General
does not make sense. If the Supreme Court had
wanted private plaintiffs to prove reliance, it
surely would have said so. Furthermore, theThird
District has rejected Elipas. In Zinser v. Rose,
that court held there is no requirement that a
plaintiff prove reliance. 5 In the present context,
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Elipas cannot be good law. Until the Supreme facts. For example, a plaintiff who does not lisCourt overrules or limits Siegel and Martin, ten to what the defendant tells him about a prodplaintiffs need not allege or prove reliance.
uct or service has not relied on defendant's statement. The same plaintiff cannot demonstrate
transaction causation because he did not listen
IV.
Loss Causation
to what the defendant said.
Even if a plaintiff need not prove reliFor a second example, assume that a
ance, the Supreme Court has clearly held that a plaintiff visited a defendant's showroom to purplaintiff must prove proximate causation to re- chase a snowmobile. During the sales presentacover damages. In Martin, the plaintiffs pur- tion, the plaintiff did not listen when the sales
chased commodities from the defendant broker. representative explained that the snowmobile was
The plaintiffs claimed they were defrauded when two years old and had been driven 1,000 miles
the broker misrepreon an Illinois farm.
sented the nature of
(In reality, the snowa "foreign service
mobile was seven
Even if a plaintiff need not
fee."' 6 According to
years old and had
the plaintiffs, the fee prove reliance, the Supreme
been driven 20,000
was actually a commiles through the CaCourt has clearly held that a
mission. The Sunadian Rockies). The
preme Court, folplaintiff, in fact, purplaintiff must prove
lowing federal secuchased the snowmorities cases, held
proximate causation to
bile because he adthat the plaintiffs
mired its color-red,
recover damages.
were required to
but recall that the
prove both transacplaintiff did not listen
tion and loss causato
the
sales
tion. "Transaction causation" means "the inves- representative's statement about the age and histor would not have engaged in the transaction tory of the machine. The plaintiff's purchasing
had the other party made truthful statements at decision, therefore, did not rely on the false statethe time required." "Loss causation" means that ment. The plaintiff could not demonstrate trans"the investor would not have suffered a loss if action causation because the plaintiff would have
17
the facts were what he believed them to be."'
purchased the snowmobile for its red color even
Thus, to recover under the Act, a plain- if the salesperson had told the truth. Thus, the
tiff need not prove reliance, but rather, must prove transaction causation requirement is essentially
transaction and loss causation. As a practical identical to a reliance requirement.
matter, proving transaction causation is almost
The loss causation requirement provides
identical to proving reliance because a plaintiff an additional check on a consumer fraud claim.
must demonstrate that he would not have pur- As an example, assume that a plaintiff entered a
chased a good or service had he known the true car dealership to purchase a used car. The sales244 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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person told the plaintiff that the car has been
driven 10,000 miles and was in mint condition.
Based upon these statements, the plaintiff purchased the car for $12,000. Later, the plaintiff
discovered the car had recently completed a career as a Chicago taxicab, logging over 100,000
miles. The plaintiff has established transaction
causation because the plaintiff would not have
purchased the car if she had known the true mileage. The plaintiff also has suffered a loss, and
she can prove loss causation because her car is
worth less than she thought it was. If her belief
that the car had been driven for only 10,000 miles
was accurate, the plaintiff would not have suffered a loss.
In Martin, by contrast, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was responsible for all
of their losses in the commodities market. In this
case, the plaintiffs purchased commodities from
the defendant broker. After suffering substantial
losses, the plaintiffs claimed that they were defrauded when the broker misrepresented the nature of a "foreign service fee" as merely an additional transaction expense, rather than what it
actually was-a commission. The fee, however,
only accounted for a small portion of the plain-
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Conclusion
Although it appears well-settled that a
plaintiff need not prove reliance to state a misrepresentation claim under the Act, a plaintiff
must prove transaction and loss causation. The
transaction causation requirement is essentially
a reliance requirement. Thus, the reliance debate
in the cases is merely one of semantics. Indeed,
it is hard to imagine awarding a recovery to a
plaintiff who did not rely on the defendant's statements. Requiring plaintiffs to prove transaction
and loss causation ensures that only plaintiffs
who are actually damaged by a defendant's conduct can recover in court.

N

815 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/1-12 (West 1992 & Supp.
1996).
2 See, e.g., Eki v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d 156, 163 (I1l.App. 2d Dist.
1991).
See Ciampi v. Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 448,
460 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1994).
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tiffs' losses. A drop in the value of commodities,
a typical investment loss caused the majority of
losses. The plaintiffs demonstrated transaction
causation, but they could not demonstrate loss
causation as to the market losses because they
would have lost money in the market even if the
commission had been a genuine "foreign service
fee." The loss causation prong separated the
losses attributable to the defendant and, the concealed fee from those attributable to the risky
commodities market.18
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643 N.E.2d 734 (I11.1994).

1 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/2 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996).
6 See, e.g., Totz v. Continental Du PageAcura, 602 N.E.2d 1374,
1382 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1992).
Malooley v. Alice, 621 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ill. App. 3d Dist.
1993) (quoting Roche v.Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda,

FeatureArticle e 245

Inc., 600 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1992)); see
also Ciampi, 634 N.E.2d at 460 (reliance required); Kleidon
v. Rizza Chevrolet, Inc., 527 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Ill. App. Ist
Dist. 1988) (reliance required); Bercoon, Weiner, Glick and
Brook v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 818 F Supp 1152, 1159
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (reliance required).
Harkala v. Wildwood Realty, Inc., 558 N.E.2d 195, 199 (Ill.
App. Ist Dist. 1990); Elder v. Coronet Ins. Co., 558 N.E.2d
1312 (1st Dist. 1990) (same).

13
14

'5

9 607 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ill. 1992).
Id. at 198; Washington Courte Condominium v. Washington
Golf Corp., 643 N.E.2d 199, 222 (Il. App. Ist Dist. 1994);
See also Edward X. Clinton, Jr., Recent Decision Under The
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act, 7 DEPAUL BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 351, 354 (1995).
643 N.E.2d 734, 754 (I11. 1994).
Is a plaintiff in a misrepresentation case required to show that
defendant made the statement for the purpose of inducing
reliance? Several appellate courts have listed such an element. See cases cited supra note 7; Eshaghi v.Hanley Dawson
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Cadillac Co., 574 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ill. App. I st Dist. 1991).
Although neither Siegel, 607 N.E.2d 194, nor Martin, 643
N.E.2d 734, addressed this specific issue, it appears that a
plaintiff need not prove this element in a misrepresentation
case.
612 N.E.2d 9 (II1.App. Ist Dist. 1993).
Id. at 12.
614 N.E.2d 1259 (III. App. 3d Dist. 1993); Celex Group, Inc.
v. The Executive Gallery, Inc., 877 F Supp. 1114, I 128 (N.D.
Ill. 1995) (following Zinser and rejecting Elipas as contrary
to Siegel, 607 N.E.2d 194; no proof of actual or justifiable
reliance required).
Supra note 12 at 739, 747.
Supra note 12 at 747 (quoting LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody
& Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Supra note 12 at 748; see also Adler v. William Blair & Co.,
648 N.E.2d 226, 234-35 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1995), appeal
denied, 163 Ill. 2d 547 (1995) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint where plaintiffs could not demonstrate that
the alleged misrepresentations had anything to do with plaintiffs' investment losses in certain real estate partnerships).
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Editor's note:
by Ray Chao
Editor in Chief

The following feature article, "Assessing Hospital CooperationLaws" by Professor James F Blumstein originally appeared in the Reporter's Special Symposium
Issue of the Loyola University Chicago School ofLaw Institutefor ConsumerAntitrust
Studies, Vol. 8, Issue 2.
In that issue, however, the author'sacknowledgments and a table were inadvertently omitted from the text. Therefore, the Reporter is proud to re-print Professor
Blumstein's article in full with our sincere apologies to the author,the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation,Allis Dale Gillmor,and our readers.
For more information on the Symposium issue or the Institute for Consumer
Antitrust Studies, please contact the Loyola ConsumerLaw Reporter.
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